STATUS QUO IN A REVOLUTIONARY SITUATION: IN THE SEARCH FOR OPTIMAL SOLUTION

The paper presents an analysis of the conditions and characteristics that affect the actions and decisions of political actors in a revolutionary situation. I considered the most important theoretical concepts that reveal the causes of revolutions, and possible ways out of the crisis. The author answers the question of whether political actors, on the basis of available information and ideas about rationality, can make optimal decisions that can exit the revolutionary situation without a sharp change in the political regime. To find solutions that cannot prevent or mitigate the consequences of the revolution, I used in the work the theoretical tools of the neo-institutional concept of veto players, and consider the concepts of policy stability — the main dependent variable in analysis, the configuration of veto players — the intermediate theoretical concept explaining this stability and the political Institute — the main independent variable. Within the framework of the proposed concept, the focus is on the rules of the game and actors, which allows blocking the adoption of a decision. As a result, there are three strategic directions that formal individual veto players can choose in a revolutionary situation. The author comes to the conclusion that the optimal solution should be sought in the deliberate creation of political instability with the help of changes in the political status quo. The main condition for non-violent exit from the revolutionary situation is the desire to develop and use political instability in a constructive way, namely: to initiate a significant change in the political status quo, reduce the influence of formal veto players on a negative agenda, rebuild the institutional structure, taking into account informal practices and public support.

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