Psychological and Communicative Aspects of Nuclear Deterrence: the Issue of Rationality and Attempts to Go Beyond the Equilibrium
https://doi.org/10.26794/2226-7867-2023-13-5-61-66
Abstract
This article is dedicated to the study of psychological and communicative aspects of nuclear deterrence. Author emphasizes that rationality of political agents is a crucial condition, specifying that it must be realist or neorealist rationality. The article shows that deterrence results in “delicate balance of terror” — the situation when none of political agents can maximize its gains by only changing his strategy. Nevertheless, political subjects try to change situation developing military technologies and altering their doctrines.
About the Author
S. V. Lebedev
Financial University; RANEPA
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
Sergei V. Lebedev — Cand. Sci. (Political Sciences), Senior Lecturer, Department of Mass Communications and Media Business, Senior Lecturer, Department of Projects and Programs Management
Moscow
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Review
For citations:
Lebedev S.V. Psychological and Communicative Aspects of Nuclear Deterrence: the Issue of Rationality and Attempts to Go Beyond the Equilibrium. Humanities and Social Sciences. Bulletin of the Financial University. 2023;13(5):61-66. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.26794/2226-7867-2023-13-5-61-66
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