Models for Explaining Consciousness in the Context of the Problem of Determining the Strong Form of AI

Abstract

The article attempts to complement the modern problems of highlighting the criteria of strong AI through discussions in the field of philosophy of consciousness. The popular ideas of D. Dennett (“multiple sketches”), J. Searle (causal emergent description) and D. Chalmers (synthetic approach to understanding consciousness) are compared with the history of the formation of the AI problem. Despite the wide discussion of the problems of consciousness and artificial forms of intelligence (strong and weak), the theories and arguments of philosophers about the psychophysiological problem remain relevant. It is assumed that clarifying the mechanism of analytical work of consciousness, the creative potential of the individual, the ability to cover a variety of phenomena in categorical forms, building axiomatic and synthetic judgments will expand the tools of machine learning. To complement the existing ideas about consciousness in the context of the prevalence of information approaches (D.I. Dubrovsky) and the analytical tradition (V.V. Vasiliev), the key provisions of the psychophysiological problem identified in the history of German and Russian philosophy are given. Given the complexity and versatility of the identified problems (definition of consciousness, psychophysiological problem, definition of AI, demarcation of weak and strong forms of AI, the importance of language for building structures of thinking, analog thinking and its capabilities), the content of the article is limited to analyzing emerging trends in philosophy and identifying prospects for further deepening into the problem.