The “Treaty between the Soviet Union and the United States on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles” (after this referred to as the “Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces — INF Treaty”), was an arms control treaty. This Treaty was abandoned after being extended for more than three decades. In the current context of competition among great powers, its abolition not only affects the military designs of the two countries but also impacts the reconstruction of regional and global strategic layouts, as well as the future of the global armament system. Against the background of significant changes in Russia’s strategic security environment during the post-INF Treaty period, Russia’s policy behaviour has exhibited a strong “security orientation”. That is, at the military level, it updates and upgrades its nuclear arsenals and continuously expands its deterrence options; at the diplomatic level, it has broken through the Western blockade by expanding Russia’s partner circle. In explanation of the reasons for the emergence of “security-oriented” behaviour characteristics in Russia, this paper argues that geopolitical narration plays a role in shaping Russia’s behaviour. On the other hand, the inertia of Russia’s policy behaviour is explained from the perspective of Russia’s national characteristics, primarily as defined by its national identity. Finally, this paper gives a brief prediction of the future trend of Russia’s behaviour and the arms control system in the post-INF Treaty period.